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TAKING MYTHS SERIOUSLY: AN ESSAY FOR LAWYERS 
DONALD C. LANGEVOORT* 
INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following claim: Much of what people believe is 
based on insufficient empirical observation, and thus often inaccurate. 
Yet their level of confidence in those beliefs is not adjusted 
downward enough to reflect the risk of inaccuracy. In other words, 
many beliefs relating to the state of the world are confidently held 
illusions or-in a sufficiently dramatic setting-myths.1 
This idea is hardly original; indeed, it is a stock insight of 
contemporary social thought. Still, I want to pursue the idea more 
deeply here, largely because lawyers do not really take it very 
seriously. To be sure, legal authors endlessly challenge other people's 
"myths" and "illusions." But the words are used mainly as a form of 
name-calling, to connote naivete or foolishness on the part of the 
believers or disingenuousness by those who propagate the belief. To 
these writers, myth means no more than popular misconception, and 
this fails to do justice to what is a much richer, and more complicated 
idea. 
Because understanding human inference and judgment is a 
fundamental research agenda in all the social sciences, the scholarly 
literature dealing with them is vast. Cognitive psychologists study it 
at the level of individual brain function and processing. In turn, 
because cognition and inference are social acts, they are also studied 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks to Mitt Regan, Vicki 
Jackson, David Luban, Brian Bix, Richard Painter, Heidi Li Feldman and participants at the 
faculty workshops at the University of Kentucky, Villanova and Vanderbilt. 
1. Some definitional points: First, I am using the term "belief' here loosely, to mean some 
mental representation of the state of the world in which the holder is confident. This is not the 
same as certainty; one can believe something even while conceding that it might not be true. It 
is the confidence that is important, and I suspect (for reasons that should become clear) that the 
appropriate level of confidence is something measured viscerally, not in terms of probabilities. 
My use of the term "myth" is fairly synonymous-it is something, usually of high cultural or 
personal significance, that is strongly believed in the face of limited knowledge. Consistent with 
the views of most scholars of myth, I do not want to equate myth with falsity. See, e.g., WENDY 
DONIGER, THE IMPLIED SPIDER: POLmCS AND THEOLOGY IN MYTH 4 (1998). 
1569 
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by social psychologists under the heading of "social cognition." 
Social cognition then blends into mainstream sociology in the form of 
"social constructionism" in the Berger and Luckmann genre? and 
from there into almost all of postmodernism.3 Like most everyone, I 
must confess readily to having read only a tiny fraction of the 
cognitive research in all these various disciplines, which for all its bulk 
is still fairly tentative, far from any convincingly documented grand 
theory of human nature. All I have done is to learn enough to be 
intrigued both by the individual claims and some of the thematic 
connections. 
The specific idea I want to explore has to do with the 
motivational power of myths and illusions on a personal level. To 
take a mundane example, people are often told to "believe in 
themselves." The underlying idea seems to be that high self-
confidence is an important motivator, especially in competitive 
settings like school, sports, business and the professions. This is not 
the idle talk of family and friends; millions of dollars are spent each 
year by people and their employers on motivational books and 
programs that offer endless variations on this simple theme in an 
effort to bolster the self-confidence of the audience. Yet the idea is 
intellectually vacant, except to the very limited extent that it is meant 
to correct a given person's erroneous belief that he or she lacks the 
skill to compete when in fact that skill is present. There are plenty of 
reasons why one may not meet high expectations, no matter how hard 
one believes or tries, and, rationally, there is never reason to ignore 
or downplay the realistic risk of failure. Is it possible, however, that 
there is something more to motivation, so that the myopic act of 
"believing in oneself" actually can payoff on average even if it is 
induced largely through some form of psychological cheerleading? 
Are there unrealistic beliefs in things besides oneself for which there 
are similar motivational payoffs? And importantly, is there a price-
personal or social-paid as a result? What follows offers some 
2. See PETER BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCI10N OF 
REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966). For an interesting review 
of more recent work, see Paul DiMaggio, Culture and Cognition, 23 ANN. REV. SOC. 263 (1997). 
3. It also enters into nearly every other discipline within the social sciences. 
Notwithstanding economics' historic commitment to the observation of outcomes rather than 
decision-processes, the cognitive dimension of research into economic behavior is becoming 
increasingly prominent there, too. See, e.g., Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 11 (1998). Contemporary research in organization theory is also heavily 
directed toward the study of how large groups perceive their environments and act in response 
to these perceptions. See, e.g., James P. Walsh, Managerial and Organizational Cognition: Notes 
from a Trip Down Memory Lane, 6 ORG. SCI. 280 (1995). 
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tentative answers that relate to law and lawyering. 
I. MYTHS AND ILLUSIONS AS ANXIETY BUFFERS 
To me, the most compelling theme in social cognition is this: 
Most social settings of interest and importance are characterized by a 
high degree of ambiguity. That ambiguity is highly stressful, 
especially in settings with a heavy goal-orientation in which 
significant decisions about the future have to be made. To reduce the 
anxiety, people unconsciously impose an order on their environment, 
a set of causal explanations that lead to an artificial, but more 
comfortable sense of predictability. As individuals, groups, 
organizations and cultures, people come to have greater confidence in 
their construals than is warranted empirically. And because of the 
continuing ambiguity in the feedback from the environment, this 
artificial confidence is often not subject to disconfirmation, and thus 
persists. 
Again, this is nothing new. Social theory has long associated 
cultural mythmaking with the need to impose order and confidence in 
the face of mystery and chaos. To hope to make a contribution, then, 
I will move to the more local level, to explore group and personal 
"anxiety buffers" in micro-settings of special interest and importance 
to lawyers. Although there are doctrinal implications one can draw 
from this-and a part of what follows will make suggestions relating 
to the field of professional responsibility and the seemingly quixotic 
effort to make lawyers more virtuous-it is the ex ante use of this 
learning on which I will mainly concentrate. At their best, lawyers 
are problem-solvers.4 They help their clients through unfamiliar and 
stressful situations, finding answers and solutions (most often through 
negotiation with others) that are satisfying enough to allow clients to 
turn their attention toward other matters. They help clients 
"satisfice," to use Herbert Simon's term, in a world of bounded 
rationality. The main value within law to understanding inference 
and decision-making better, then, is simply that lawyers are involved 
in so much difficult inference and decision-making in their own 
professional lives and the lives of their clients. 
4. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Responsibility of Law Schools: Educating Lawyers as 
Counselors and Problem Solvers, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1995); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Taking Problem-Solving Pedagogy Seriously: A Response to the Attorney General, 49 
J. LEGAL Eouc. 14 (1999). 
HeinOnline -- 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1572 1998-2000
1572 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:1569 
A. Individual Sense-Making 
Even within psychology, the processes by which people make 
sense of their environments is the subject of study from a set of often 
inconsistent research agendas. For many, the organizing metaphor is 
the human mind as a computer-like information processor. Within 
this genre, some researchers probe for evidence of consistent 
rationality. Others-the recently celebrated "heuristics and biases" 
branch of the study of judgment and decision-making5 -100k for 
mental models that are prone to predictable error, even if they are 
useful and adaptive much of the time. Still others use different 
images. Social cognition may be described, for example, by invoking 
the image of people as "intuitive politicians,"6 or even "intuitive 
lawyers. "7 
Whatever the preferred metaphor, the majority of psychologists 
see the process of sense-making as a highly creative task. That is to 
say, the amount of data available to the individual in most situations 
. is far short of that necessary for inference that meets anything 
resembling well-grounded empiricism, and the mind lacks the 
capacity to process all of that which is available. Hence, through a 
variety of shortcuts, the mind fills in the gaps. That much is not very 
controversial. The divisive question is what drives the gap-filling. 
Some psychologists contend that all that drives it are the very 
demands of simplification. There is a large literature that locates 
heuristic processes simply within the framework of limited data and 
limited processing capacity: these are cold, cognitive traits that are no 
more than the best available methods of sense-making.8 But I find 
myself drawn to the research that treats people as strongly needing to 
make sense of things, so that the creative gap-filling is driven by the 
demand for greater certainty than nature will otherwise allow. Such 
certainty, illusory or not, is an antidote to stress and anxiety. 
5. This literature has become very popular among legal academics. See e.g., Robert C. 
Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law 
and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 
64 U. Cm. L. REv. 1175 (1997). For a survey, see Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories 
of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 
1499 (1998). 
6. See, e.g., Philip E. Tetlock, An Alternative Metaphor in the Study of Judgment and 
Choice: People as Politicians, 1 THEORY & PSYCHOL. 451 (1991). 
7. See, e.g., Roy F. Baumeister & Leonard S. Newman, Self-Regulation of Cognitive 
Inference and Decision Processes, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 3 (1994). 
8. See RICHARD NISBETI & LEE Ross, HVMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND 
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 228-34 (1980). 
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Many of the well-known "heuristics and biases" fit nicely into 
such a motivational story. The tendency of people to find illusory 
correlations, and see trends where there really is no causation, is a 
good example. So is the hindsight bias, the tendency to overestimate 
the likelihood that one could have foreseen some future event once 
one is told that the event actually occurred.9 The fundamental 
attribution bias says that people overestimate their ability to predict 
how another will act based on their knowledge of that person's 
character and disposition, underestimating the influence of situational 
factors. Each of these supports a feeling of control through an 
illusory ability to predict more about the future than one really can. 
What all these heuristics involve is a guess-on average, a good 
one. And it would be hard to make much of a motivational claim if 
people tended to recognize their inferences - and the process of 
sense-making-as the guesswork that it is. But another robust finding 
in the literature is that people develop higher levels of confidence in 
the accuracy of their inferences than is warranted. This is the famous 
"overconfidence effect,"10 observed especially among American 
males. Asked to estimate their confidence in the accuracy of their 
judgments, people (including many experts)11 usually estimate too 
high. While this, too, might be purely cognitive, I find irresistible the 
inference that the overconfidence is evolutionarily adaptive. 
The evolutionary story, which can be told in terms of either 
economics12 or biology,n is simple. Doubt and uncertainty are 
paralyzing. By contrast, the strong belief that one understands what 
is going on leads to more confident predictions, and hence action. 
Confidence is associated with initiative and persistence. What's 
9. For a legal audience, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of 
Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 571 (1998). 
10. See MAx H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 37-39, 46 
(3d ed. 1994). 
11. See Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental 
Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REv. 306 (1999). In recent years, there has been a steady increase in 
the willingness of mainstream finance theorists to claim that overconfidence is an important 
factor in explaining stock price behavior. See, e.g., Kent Daniel et aI., Investor Psychology and 
Security Market Under-and Overreactions, 53 J. FIN. 1839 (1998). 
12. That is, seeing what traits will give their holder the best "survivorship" capacity within 
specific cultural or institutional settings. See generally Richard R. Nelson, Recent Evolutionary 
Theorizing About Economic Change, 33 J. ECON. LITERATURE 48 (1995). 
13. In the sociobiology literature, confidence and optimism are closely related, and both 
are viewed as genetically favored. For the seminal study, see generally LIONEL DGER, 
OPTIMISM: THE BIOLOGY OF HOPE (1979). For an approach combining biology and economics, 
see generally Michael Waldman, Systematic Errors and the Theory of Natural Selection, 84 AM. 
ECON. REv. 482 (1994). 
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more, it has a wonderful capacity to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Not only will better events, on average, occur to those who show 
initiative and persistence, the reaction of others to displays of 
confidence often leads others to defer and let the confident person 
leadY There is a story told by Albert Szent-Gyorti that captures this 
perfectly.15 A platoon of soldiers during World War II was lost in the 
Alps. Overcome with fear and despair, they did little until an officer 
found a map. Then they rallied, worked and finally found their way 
to safety. Only later did they learn that the map was of the Pyrenees, 
not the Alps. 
Among other things, this story helps show why illusory 
confidence will often not be learned away by trial and error. 
Overconfidence will be eroded by negative feedback that is 
immediate and unambiguous. Weather forecasters, for example, 
learn to calibrate probabilities fairly well because they are engaged in 
repeat tasks with prompt feedback. In contrast, most of us operate in 
environments where the consequences of our actions rarely become 
evident immediately. If and when they do, there are multiple possible 
causes and explanations. In the face of ambiguity, illusions can 
persist if we are motivated enough to want to sustain them. It is often 
observed that high-ranking business executives can operate for long 
periods of time in settings with sufficiently fuzzy and delayed 
feedback from their choices and hence have ample room to maintain 
their personal and group myths.16 So, I suspect, do lawyers and their 
clients. 
So far, I have suggested that people often deyelop excess 
confidence in their explanations of situations and events. Their 
"schemas" and beliefs are stronger than they should be because 
confidence is energizing, lack of confidence debilitating. But this says 
nothing about the likely content of sense-making strategies. Here we 
can make a simple and intuitive leap. If strong inferences and beliefs 
are adaptive because they are stress-reducing and confidence-
building, then the kinds of illusory inferences that are most likely to 
develop and persist are those that best play a similar motivational 
14. On the influence of confidence within groups, see generally Paul Zamoth & Janet A. 
Sniezek, The Social Influence of Confidence in Group Decision Making, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
SOc. PSYCHOL. 345 (1997). 
15. It is related in KARL E. WEICK, SENSEMAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS 54 (1995). 
16. In this sphere, the work of James G. March is particularly prominent. See, e.g., JAMES 
G. MARCH, DECISIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS (1988); Barbara Levitt & James .G. March, 
Organizational Learning, 14 ANN. REv. SOc. 319 (1988); James G. March & Zur Shapira, 
Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking, 33 MGMT. SCI. 1404 (1987). 
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role. 
By far the favorite adaptive form of inference in the 
psychological literature is egotistical inferenceP There is a strong 
self-serving bias to people's judgments and decisions. People need to 
see themselves as good and reasonable, and subconsciously distort 
evidence ("rationalize") with impunity to bolster or maintain a 
positive self-image. Because it goes to one's fundamental sense of 
identity, this is one kind of personal bias that I think properly 
deserves the word "myth." One tells stories to oneself that inflate 
feelings of efficacy and control, establishing a sense of identity less 
susceptible to the threats of the everyday world. That is why egos are 
so prickly, people so averse to criticism. The illusion of self-efficacy 
that people build in their lives is a buffer against anxiety; ego-threats 
attack that buffer and hence threaten to increase stress. Indeed, there 
is one strand of research in social psychology that sees self-esteem 
specifically as a "terror management" device.ls High self-esteem, the 
proponents argue, leads to the feeling that one has an important 
influence and place in society. It even reduces the fear of death by 
allowing individuals to see themselves as part of something enduring. 
The psychological literature offers other possible anxiety buffers 
as well. Another strong one, I suspect, is the illusion of normalcy. 
For a variety of reasons, people are inclined to interpret new data as 
consistent with their prevailing perceptions, not as requiring revision. 
Change is distracting and stressful. The first subtle signals of change, 
including those that suggest danger (what lawyers like to call "red 
flags"), are often ignored.19 
Another intriguing body of research comes under the heading of 
17. The classic account here is found in Anthony G. Greenwald, The Totalitarian Ego: 
Fabrication and Revision of Personal History, 35 AM. PSYCHOL. 603 (1980). I explored this 
phenomenon explicitly in Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. 
REv. 853 (1995). As with overconfidence, there may be significant gender and cultural effects 
here: the illusion of self-efficacy is more pronounced in males, and observed less strongly in 
other cultures. However, we should be careful not to generalize too strongly here. See id. at 860 
n.25. 
18. See, e.g., Jeff Greenberg et aI., Why Do People Need Self-Esteem?: Converging 
Evidence that Self-Esteem Serves an Anxiety Buffering Function, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 913 (1992); Sheldon Solomon et aI., A Terror Management Theory of Social Behavior: 
The Psychological Functions of Self-Esteem and Cultural Worldviews, 24 ADVANCES 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 93 (1991). Their work relates to the cultural theories made 
popular by Ernest Becker. See, e.g., ERNEST BECKER, THE BIRTH AND DEATH OF MEANING 
(1962). 
19. Of interest to lawyers should be an account of the illusion of normalcy during the time 
leading up to the recall of the Ford Pinto after warning signs appeared regarding its fuel tank 
safety. See, e.g., Dennis A. Gioia, Pinto Fires and Personal Ethics: A Script Analysis of Missed 
Opponunities, 11 J. Bus. ETHICS 379 (1992). 
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"just world" thinking.20 There is a documented tendency among a 
significant segment of the population to consider the world relatively 
"just" in terms of causes and consequences. On average-I doubt 
that many people would say always-good things happen to good 
people, bad things to bad. The obvious consequence is to judge a 
tragic situation by blaming the victim. This is a commonly observed 
phenomenon, for example, in rape cases. The standard explanation 
for the prevalence of this kind of thinking is specifically stress-related: 
such a belief, coupled with an egotistical self-concept, reduces the fear 
that bad things will happen to oneself. 
A further possibility that I find particularly interesting-and 
quite important legally-has to do with trust and reliance. A 
common observation is that many people trust others, especially 
authority figures, to a greater extent than prudence would warrant. 
There is a good chance, then, that trust is motivated. One reason 
(among many, admittedly) has to do with the desire to displace the 
anxiety and potential for regret associated with an important decision 
by shifting both responsibility and potential blame to another. 
Patients' faith in their doctors is a common illustration. I have 
suggested elsewhere that stockbrokers and investment advisers playa 
similar role, with an obvious temptation for the manipulation of 
trust.21 Here we have an interesting confluence with the egotistic 
bias-those with the most self-confidence will be able to induce the 
most trusting behavior by others. There is also a comparable 
explanation for conformity: again, reducing anxiety by choosing to 
follow the lead of others, with the associated confidence-building 
cognition that they must know what they are doing. 
I could go on, but I suspect that I have made the point. People's 
sense-making strategies are often driven by a desire to see their world 
as more understandable, predictable and controllable than it really is. 
This does not mean that inferences become utterly unrealistic. There 
are strong limits to how much reality can be distorted by people who 
must function within social, institutional and marketplace constraints. 
But in ambiguous settings where one's mind is free to engage in the 
20. See, e.g., MELVIN J. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD (1981); KELLY G. 
SHAVER, THE ATTRIBUTION OF BLAME: CAUSALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND 
BLAMEWORTHINESS 132-34 (1985); Alan Lambert et aI., Perceptions of Risk and the Buffering 
Hypothesis: The Role of Just World Beliefs and Right Wing Authoritarianism, 25 PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 643 (1999). 
21. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law 
from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 
627 (1996). 
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creative interpretation of events, illusions can be strong and 
persistent. 
If our adaptation story is right, they are not necessarily such bad 
things, either-on average. Yet they do produce occasional bad, 
sometimes even disastrous, judgments. Moreover, something left 
unclear in the literature is whether the buffering function really just 
represses the anxiety, so that the more work the mind has to do to 
maintain the myth and fuel the confidence in the face of adverse 
feedback, the greater the toll in terms of stress-related physical and 
mental disorders.22 At the very least, we should note a temporal 
dimension here: over time, with more and more feedback, the ease 
with which the mind can deflect negative attributions diminishes. So, 
too, with success; as one gains power and responsibility, it becomes 
harder to externalize blame. It would not be surprising, then, to find 
among those who have achieved much a gradual progression toward 
what Max Weber (with respect to cultural beliefs) called 
"disenchantment." At some point, a person may finally see that the 
successes that he had turned into an inspiring story about merit were 
as much or more the product of luck. Whether this is simple 
maturation or something more threatening is hard to say. Many 
psychologists claim that society'S greatest realists are the moderately 
depressed.23 
B. Group Myths and Illusions 
Sense-making is largely a social act. The story of the lost military 
patrol was really about group anxiety and group confidence, and a 
large amount of research in social cognition speaks to the processes of 
perception and inference among sets of individuals. The precise 
relationship between individual cognitions and group processes is 
highly contested among students of group and organizational 
behavior.24 Still, it is common to see claims that the same kinds of 
heuristics, biases and other illusion-producing tendencies observed 
among individuals can also be observed in groupS.25 In fact, in many 
22. The incidence of stress related disorders among high achievers is often noted. For a 
discussion of the pathologies of success, see generally CHARLES M. KELLY, THE DESTRUCTIVE 
ACHIEVER: POWER AND ETHICS IN THE AMERICAN CORPORATION (1988). 
23. See, e.g., SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNmON 214-15 (2d ed. 
1991). 
24. See, e.g., Barry M. Staw & Robert I. Sutton, Macro Organizational Psychology, in 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS 350 (J. Keith Murnighan ed., 1993). 
25. See Norbert Kerr et ai., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 
PSYCH. REV. 687, 687 (1996). 
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instances, group settings have been shown to exacerbate or intensify 
these biases. Groups of individuals working together toward some 
aim face a variety of challenges that require strongly heuristic forms 
of behavior: they have to communicate information to each other, 
identify the nature of their task, assess costs, benefits and potential 
strategies, and arrive at some consensus for action. Groups will be 
more effective to. the extent that there are common perceptions or 
inferences not subject to time-consuming and stressful renegotiation. 
Members risk exclusion if they introduce stressful dissonant 
information into a group setting once the group has implicitly agreed 
to think otherwise. This, in turn, leads to the suppression of 
information and ideas and cognitive conformity above and beyond 
what any individual acting alone might bring to the situation. Irving 
Janis became famous for terming this process "groupthink," which he 
and his colleagues explain explicitly as a stress reduction mechanism.26 
For example, the bias toward optimism and self-efficacy has been 
shown to be even greater in groups than it is in individuals.27 Groups 
edit out negative information in order to maintain cohesion; the 
information flow bias in favor of positive or reinforcing data 
intensifies the feeling of power and control among members. While 
this can, as Janis emphasizes, sometimes lead to poor decision-
making, on balance the effect is quite positive. The stress reduction 
leads to better focus, concentration and persistence. By increasing 
confidence and sense of group efficacy, members are more likely to 
trust each other, rather than engage in the kinds of selfish behavior 
triggered by fear and anxiety. That, in turn, makes the group that 
much more effective-another self-fulfilling prophecy that can readily 
reinforce members' perceptions that they were right all along. 
Sense-making accounts can be found in many other areas of 
social behavior. As put in a classic study by Gordon Allport and Leo 
Postman, rumors relieve "intellectual pressure" that arises because 
"we want to know the why, how and wherefore of the world that 
surrounds us... our minds protest against chaos."28 This sense-
making role has significant influence in organizational and market 
settings, where uncertainty is commonplace, rumors rampant and 
26. IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK 9 (1982). For a more comprehensive study, see 
generally IRVING L. JANIS & LEON MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
OF CONFLICf, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT (1977). 
27. See, e.g., Chip Heath & Forest J. Jourden, Illusion, Disillusion and the Buffering Effect 
of Groups, 69 ORG. BEHA V. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 103 (1997). 
28. GORDON W. ALLPORT & LEO POSTMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR 37 (1947). 
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confidence crucia1.29 
The role of myth is also prominent in the study of organizations. 
In one of the seminal articles in the "new institutional" sociology of 
organizations, John Meyer and Brian Rowan talk about myth and 
ceremony as common responses to the ambiguity and anxiety that 
firms face in settings where the right strategy is a matter of 
institutional guesswork.30 Among the common "myths" -just as in 
classic cultural and religious myths-is the creation story: the account 
of how the organization came to be in a way that gives it a special 
sense of identity and purpose. Not surprisingly, the typical stories of 
"unique" organizational identity, of what makes the organization 
special and different, vary little from each other.31 Yet they play 
important roles as guides to behavior. In their study of institutional 
investors, William O'Barr and John Conley argue that "founding 
stories" account for significant variations in how the institutions make 
investment decisions.32 
Just like individuals, organizations are conformists. They pursue 
legitimacy in the eyes of key resource providers and hence take cues 
as to right behavior from others who have achieved an apparent level 
of success. The result is a "mimetic" process whereby common 
beliefs and practices diffuse among organizations.33 While social 
conformity can be explained without resort to any strong cognitive 
element, sociology is increasingly willing to posit that people within 
organizations come to adopt beliefs heavily influenced by the desire 
to gain or preserve legitimacy. Because of this motivational 
influence, these beliefs need not track reality all that closely: there 
evolves only a "loose coupling" between organizational sense-making 
and objective evidence. These illusions are functional insofar as they 
motivate, protect against anxiety, and assist in creating group 
cohesion. 
29. See generally Nicholas DiFonzo et ai., Reining in Rumors, 23 ORG. DYNAMICS 47 
(1994); Nicholas DiFonzo & Prashant Bordia, Rumor and Prediction: Making Sense (but Losing 
Dollars) in the Stock Market, 71 ORG. BEHA v. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 329 (1997). 
30. See generally John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal 
Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340 (1977). 
31. Job interviewees might take note that answers to the inevitable question "what makes 
your firmJlaw school/company different?" lead to very similar answers among firms, law schools 
and companies. 
32. See generally WILLIAM O'BARR & JOHN M. CONLEY, FORTUNE AND FOLLY: THE 
WEALTH AND POWER OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING (1992). 
33. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter w. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 151 
(1983). 
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So far, the examples of social construction that we have 
examined are fairly benign. But if there is such a thing as group 
narcissism,34 identity and performance myths may become self-serving 
in the same way that individual narcissism can blind people to the 
harms that they do to others. There are many studies in the social 
psychology of organizations of how in-group biases can lead to self-
serving forms of inference. Of particular interest to lawyers, a 
fascinating set of papers shows how various aspects of employment 
and equal opportunity law have been construed by "human resource" 
professionals (including lawyers) in a way that serves the self-interest 
of those professionals.35 While it would be easy to offer such an 
account purely in political terms-deliberate rent-seeking-I suspect 
that the professionals sincerely come to believe in their constructions, 
something that makes them more committed, confident and 
persuasive in the intensely political corporate world. One could tell a 
similar story about lawyers' use of overprotective (and expensive) 
boilerplates in contract negotiations36 and corporate lawyers' 
commitment to the diffusion of anti takeover techniques like the 
poison pill,37 which for whatever value they deliver to clients certainly 
increases the wealth of the professionals who design and implement 
them. 
II. SOME IMPLICATIONS 
My claim so far boils down to the idea that people are inclined to 
make sense of their environment via creative interpretation, reducing 
the anxiety of uncertainty by imposing artificial and illusory 
coherence. Predictably, the explanations that are the most adaptive 
as sense-making devices are the ones that prompt useful forms of 
behavior (confidence, persistence, etc.) by operating as anxiety 
buffers. 
34. See generally Andrew D. Brown, Narcissism, Identity and Legitimacy, 22 ACAD. MGMT. 
REv. 643 (1997); see also infra text accompanying notes 58-61. 
35. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The 
Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace, 95 AM. J. SOc. 1401, 1417 (1990); Lauren 
B. Edelman et aI., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 
26 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 47, 49 (1992). 
36. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: 
Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347,348 (1996). See 
generally Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of 
Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375 (1997). 
37. See Michael J. Powell, Professional Innovation: Corporate Lawyers and Private 
Lawmaking, 18 LAW & SOc. INQUIRY 423, 423 (1993). 
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This triggers three almost scripted reactions among lawyers. The 
first is to point to the palpable prevalence of stress and anxiety in 
modern life as reason to doubt that any "buffers" exist or, if they do, 
work very welL That, however, misunderstands the nature of 
buffering. The world is an extraordinarily stress-producing place, 
often in ways too unambiguous to rationalize. What these 
psychological devices do is simply provide a mechanism for managing 
stress, deflecting that which can be put aside so that the task of 
dealing with what is left is more tractable. To use the story of the lost 
platoon once again, no doubt even with the illusion of a map the 
soldiers were anxious. The point is simply that without the map, the 
stress was that much greater, crossing the line from manageable to 
debilitating. 
The second reaction is: "I knew that already. Tell me something 
new." As 1 acknowledged at the outset, the common presence of 
cultural myths, with their anxiety-reducing role, is a standard 
intellectual insight. And most everyone has observed, in others at 
least, the everyday presence of rationalization, denial, egotism and 
other common tools of self-deception. 
While many in the law-trained audience will thus say that they 
know that such cognitive mechanisms exist, 1 strongly suspect that 
most implicitly marginalize them. Biases, they say, are the stuff of 
weak-mindedness, observable among the general population but not 
among those who are smart and successful and acting in settings 
where good decisions "count." Perhaps they help us understand 
foolish consumer behavior (gambling and smoking, for example), but 
in the Darwinian competition for survival in high-stakes games - the 
games lawyers and their well-heeled clients play-they simply can't 
be of much importance. 
That perception is, of course, a psychologist's delight, for it is a 
perfect example of an egocentric tendency much the subject of 
classical myth - hubris. The striking insight from the sense-making 
literature is that distortions of reality, especially things such as 
overconfidence and over-optimism, are commonplace among skilled, 
educated people. And, even more counterintuitively, some of their 
success may actually be due to the presence of such myths and 
illusions. Myth-making is stable in an evolutionary sense even among 
the "fittest." 
Still, lawyers tend to resist this, especially within their own world. 
The in-group rhetoric of lawyering is extraordinarily rationalist, and 
that discourse cannot be abandoned without doing substantial 
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violence to the vanity embedded in the prevailing professional self-
image. This, in turn, spills over into perceptions of and relationships 
with the larger world. Psychologists have identified a strong human 
tendency, termed the "false consensus effect," to overestimate the 
extent to which others share one's own attitudes, beliefs and 
inferences.38 Interpersonal communication often fails because the 
speaker wrongly assumes a coincidence of beliefs and perceptions, 
and hence fails to do the work needed to understand, connect and 
persuade.39 As we shall see later on, lawyers who project too much of 
their own myth of rationality onto others run the risk of failing to 
understand them, compromising their ability to advise or negotiate 
effectively. 
The third predictable reaction is: "So what? Give me something 
normative." Depending on whose sense-making strategies we want to 
consider, there are many possible responses. The legal literature has 
begun to address some of these: a good example would be the recent 
coupling of articles by Jon Hanson and Douglas Kysar. They explore 
smokers' myths and the ability of tobacco companies to manipulate 
and extend them. Then, they offer a clear normative response: 
continued, if not greater, emphasis on enterprise liability.40 Along 
very different lines, any significant look at the behavior of juries 
would want to consider their sense-making strategies: how jurors 
create mental "stories" as they confront evidence offered at trial, 
stories that produce coherence, but not necessarily accuracy. 
Psychologists Reid Hastie and Nancy Pennington have developed a 
celebrated and very helpful research program built around the "story 
model" of jury cognition.41 
But I suspect that most of these still indulge the hubris previously 
observed, concentrating on the non-elite strata of society to find 
illustrations of illusory thinking for which to develop appropriate 
38. See Gary Marks & Nonnan Miller, Ten Years of Research on the False-Consensus 
Effect: An Empirical and Theoretical Review, 102 PSYCHOL. BULL. 72, 72 (1987). 
39. See Dale W. Griffin & Lee Ross, Subjective Construal, Social Inference and Human 
Misunderstanding, 24 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 319, 337-45 (1991). 
40. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some 
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1420, 1468 (1999); Jon D. Hanson & 
Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 707-09, 732-33 (1999). Some of my work in corporate and securities law 
extends similar insights about myths and illusions, with nonnative recommendations. See, e.g., 
Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead 
Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REv. 101, 108, 171-72 
(1997). 
41. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: 
The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 519, 520-21, 538 (1991). 
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legal responses. What I would suggest here is that lawyers look more 
closely at their own worlds for anxiety buffers and other forms of 
myth-thinking. With respect to my interests, that takes us to the 
world of corporate executives and corporate lawyers. 
A. The Entrepreneurial Mind 
The most obvious connection between law and the kind of stress-
deflecting cognitive distortions that we have identified has to do with 
risk-taking. At the risk of some oversimplification, the cognitive 
distortions we observe among successful segments of the population 
are those that create a heightened sense of confidence and control 
over the immediate environment. For all its positive pay-offs, this 
may blunt the perception of risk, leading to choices that sometimes 
cause harm. Buffered anxiety is not likely to produce prudence, 
especially when evaluated in hindsight. 
While it is again tempting to pursue this normatively (it says 
much of use to tort law, I suspect), I am more intrigued by how a 
business lawyer, who by intuition or training is adept at identifying 
these kinds of myths among clients and adversaries, might use that 
skill. The obvious temptation would be to exploit them. In fact, one 
can look at the so-called "art" of sales and marketing as just that-the 
skill at finding and feeding other people's illusions and getting their 
money before reality sets in.42 The sale of a business at a high price is 
easier if the prospective buyers' fantasies of competence, wealth and 
status are well-primed. The strong subconscious desire to trust in a 
business relationship can also be exploited by donning the external 
trappings of trustworthiness. Whether it is ethical to do these sorts of 
thing is an obvious and important question, though not one that raises 
any conceptually different issues from those in the well-played-out 
debate over gamesmanship and candor in negotiations generally.43 
Because there will usually be lawyers on the other side, such 
manipUlativeness might be checked even when the opposing client is 
otherwise susceptible to influence. Of course, the Machiavellian 
lawyer could simply tum his art to opposing counsel, seeking to take 
advantage of the opponent's ego or desire for status to drive a wedge 
42 See generally ROBERT B. ClALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 
(1996). 
43. See, e.g., Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IOWA L. REV. 
1219, 1220-21 (1990); James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in 
Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 926, 929-31. 
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between the lawyer and his or her client's interests. I suspect that 
that happens more than we would like to admit. As is often made 
plain by those who teach negotiation skills to lawyers with a heavy 
dosage of psychology, the most important use of this training is 
defensive: learning how not to be taken advantage of in this fashion, 
by learning to recognize your own capacity to rationalize 
concessions.44 
Serious discussion of influence activities by lawyers tends to stop 
with tactics directed toward the opposing side. But stopping here 
would be a serious mistake because it misses a more dimly 
illuminated aspect of sophisticated legal practice. At this point, I 
think, the relevance of mythic sense-making should shift to the 
negotiation of reality that occurs between lawyers and clients. 
Imagine, for example, that a lawyer believes that her client, say a 
start-up entrepreneur seeking external financing, has an 
unrealistically optimistic sense of the prospects for his business. This 
is hardly a far-fetched example, for start-up entrepreneurs are a well-
studied breed, prone toward greater over-optimism and illusions of 
control than the general population.45 It is especially apt if we situate 
this client in Silicon Valley, perhaps the most fertile soil for the 
creation of contemporary American myths. A natural response, with 
a long pedigree in the literature on the lawyer as the "dispassionate 
counselor," is for the lawyer to undertake the task of turning the 
client into a realist and emphasize the need to bargain hard for 
"downside" risk protection. There are ample and sobering statistics, 
for example, on start-up fatalities. Indeed, lawyers do seem to relish 
throwing cold water on other people's hopes and dreams, which 
happens to be a good way of establishing their own superior 
sophistication and experience.46 But I suspect that most successful 
44. Robert Cialdini notes explicitly that his effort in writing about the psychology of 
influence was to enable people to resist influence tactics, but that the greatest interest in the 
book is on the part of those who wish to learn to manipulate others more effectively. Robert B. 
Cialdini, Social Influence and the Triple Tumor Structure of Organizational Dishonesty, in 
CODES OF CONDUCf: BERA VIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 44, 44 (David M. 
Messick & Ann E. TenbrunseI eds., 1996). 
45. See, e.g., Lowell W. Busenitz & Jay B. Barney, Differences Between Entrepreneurs and 
Managers in Large Organizations: Biases and Heuristics in Strategic Decision-Making, 12 J. Bus. 
VENTURING 9, 15 (1997). A recent best-selling book about Silicon VaHey entrepreneurs is filled 
with examples of very strong optimistic illusions. See generally Po BRONSON, THE NUDIST ON 
THE LATE SHIFT AND OTHER TRUE TALES OF SILICON VALLEY (1999). 
46. This may simply be egotistical, but perhaps not entirely. A number of studies have 
suggested that negative or critical talk tends to be viewed as more intelligent than optimistic, 
positive talk. In situations where clients or principals have imperfect information on which to 
evaluate a person, that bias might matter. See Jeffrey Pfeffer & Robert I. Sutton, The Smart-
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ones avoid doing this too strongly, for three reasons: 
(1) Challenging someone's "illusions," especially early in a 
relationship, is rarely successful and tends simply to undermine the 
relationship. The threat closes lines of communication, and if strong 
enough, may even lead to termination of the relationship. The lawyer 
may lose a client who is looking for a teammate, not a critic. 
(2) The over-optimism is probably going to be a necessary 
energy source if the business is to have much chance of survival. The 
risk of failure is reduced if the entrepreneurs have strong faith in their 
ability to succeed, and the lawyer does not want to discourage such 
faith. Indeed, some financiers may treat the presence of doggedly 
unrealistic optimism as something of a litmus test for providing the 
money in the first place, and the lawyer will not want to interfere with 
the client's ability to send the necessary signals. 
(3) Just as important, but a bit more subtle, the blind faith itself 
may provide surplus capital on which to base the deal in question. 
Venture capital financing often leaves surprisingly little for the 
entrepreneur in terms of equity and contro1.47 The residual equity 
interest is worth much more if viewed from behind rose-colored 
glasses. Without an optimistically skewed valuation by the 
entrepreneur, there might not be enough to offer the financing firm to 
induce them to take what they know, better than the entrepreneur, is 
risky. At the very least, the deal will probably come to fruition more 
smoothly if the entrepreneur has an inflated valuation of the 
residual.48 
Talk Trap, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1999, at 135, 138. 
47. There is a large amount of literature on the reasons for this, most of which sensibly 
explain the structures in economic terms. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, 
Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Bank Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. 
ECON. 243, 244-46 (1998). However, note of over-optimism's possible influence has been taken. 
See Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1737, 1764 
(1994); Joseph Bankman & Ronald Gilson, Why Start-Ups?, 51 STAN. L. REv. 289, 291 n.3 
(1999). Bankman and Gilson note an intriguing study showing that 1/3 of Silicon Valley 
engineers place themselves in the top five percent of that same group in terms of talent (ninety 
percent put themselves in the top 114). See Bankman & Gilson. 
48. The economic roles of optimism and pessimism in negotiations is explored in Jennifer 
Gerarda Brown, The Role of Hope in Negotiation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1661, 1674-78 (1997). To 
be clear, client over-optimism is not always value-adding, and often the lawyer will have to try 
to neutralize the bias. When the overly optimistic entrepreneur is a seller rather than a buyer 
(e.g., in a merger transaction involving the sale of a business), the inflated internal valuation 
may be a barrier to the deal. In that case, the lawyer faces the touchy task of making the client 
more "realistic." I suspect that this is an area in which many lawyers fare poorly, especially if 
they use purely rational, argumentative discourse in an effort to make their points. The "ex 
ante" point is the same: business lawyers, to be successful, must know how to deal with client 
illusions, which ever way they cut. For a discussion of the challenges that lawyers face when 
they try to challenge corporate myths, see generally Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology 
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This poses an interesting dilemma for practitioners. Less-than-
full candor has significant benefits for the client: preserving the 
inflated but useful self-confidence, and minimizing transaction costs. 
The obvious cost to the client is some loss of autonomy, which may 
not be preserved without at the same time placing those benefits at 
risk. There is no easy way out,49 and most lawyers by intuition and 
training are mal-adept at the interpersonal communication skills 
needed to even try mediating between myth and reality for a client. 
What is even more interesting, however, is the way in which the 
lawyer's own self-interest comes into play in addressing this 
dilemma.5o Sometimes, to be sure, the lawyer wants a more realistic 
client, and I do not doubt that lawyers often usefully "debias" their 
clients. But not always. Indeed, at the risk of sounding a bit cynical, I 
would guess that an important "family secret" skill that defines many 
economically successful business lawyers is an ability to skew client 
beliefs when the situation warrants, creating illusions if necessary to 
meet specific needs and desires.51 Savvy business lawyers often want 
to be known for the ability to get deals done,52 and, given the well-
known barriers to agreement in complex transactions,53 deals will 
of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. 
REv. 629 (1997). 
49. One way the lawyer might seek compromise is to set forth discussion of the downside 
risks in a way that treats them as "boilerplate" material that should not bother the client all that 
much. That, however, is just another form of deception: to be fully informed and decide what to 
bargain for (and how hard), the client needs information not only as to the possibility of risk, 
but also the likelihood. In other words, the truly informed client needs to come to grips that the 
risk of failure is a serious one for him or her. 
50. On the problem of deceiving one's own clients, largely focusing on deceptions that are 
truly malicious, see generally Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 659 (1990). 
On the temptation of lawyers to overstate legal risks to clients, for any number of self-serving or 
"utilitarian" reasons, see generally Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 36. 
51. The possibility that lawyers engage in "snow jobs" with respect to their clients is 
observed in John Flood, Doing Business: The Management of Uncertainty in Lawyers' Work, 25 
LAW & SOC'y REv. 41, 63-66 (1991). The specific example given is the overstatement of the 
particular lawyer's expertise for handling a matter. 
52. This reputational interest poses a challenge because it is also in the lawyer's self-
interest to avoid blame when some event comes to pass that could have been prevented by 
either more skillful drafting or not doing the deal at all. See generally Kahan & Klausner, supra 
note 36; Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 36. In terms of this latter concern, lawyers have 
good reason to be nay-sayers or "deal killers." But I suspect that sophisticated clients with 
strong transactional needs sense this, and seek out lawyers with reputations as deal-promoters. 
Nay-sayers as lawyers (and there are many) are ones either without the savvy to sense this in the 
face of all the "negative" training lawyers receive or ones who are not repeat players in the deal-
making business. 
53. A good survey of the psychological barriers is Robert H. Mnookin & Lee Ross, 
Introduction, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 3,3 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995). 
An excellent article on ways to "harness" overconfidence and self-serving bias via the greater 
use of contingent contracting is Max H. Bazerman & James J. Gillespie, Betting on the Future: 
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sometimes happen only because someone works hard to sell it to the 
parties. For the "deal flow" to keep moving, it sometimes takes a 
kind of salesman-like puffery with one's own client. This might 
involve an illusion of comfort by obscuring low-level legal risks, or 
maybe priming the clients' optimistic fantasies to inject an adrenaline 
shot of hunger for the deal. 
The fear that lawyers do not always want a completely informed 
client is not entirely speculative. Return to Silicon Valley. An 
intriguing field study by legal sociologists Mark Suchman and Mia 
Cahill contends that although such lawyers formally take on 
entrepreneurs as clients, they in fact act almost as double agents, 
compromising vigorous advocacy of client interests in the name of 
getting the deal done and maintaining good relationships with 
financiers for future interactions.54 Whether this is a problem worth 
worrying about is not entirely clear: if the clients are aware of what is 
happening before they retain the lawyers, this "mediator" 
arrangement may very much be in their best interests.55 If there is less 
than informed consent, then we have an interesting issue. Suchman 
and Cahill claim that in acting as "proselytizers" for conventional 
ways of doing business in the Valley, the lawyers "tread[] near the 
boundaries of conventional legal ethics"56 by downplaying the 
interests of individual clients, and hence we can at least wonder about 
the consent. If they are right in their concern, then we should also 
worry about how informed the clients are regarding the legal/business 
risks associated with the deals they seek. 
At the same time, however, the authors note the same benefit 
from this sort of posture that we did: Silicon Valley lawyers are 
facilitating important economic transactions at lower cost and with 
less disruptive adversarial behavior than in most other settings. And 
this raises the question of whether the lawyers come to construe their 
own professional situation in a way that makes any sense of moral 
dilemma about how informed their clients really are disappear. 
These lawyers are fond of portraying themselves (aided and abetted 
The Virtues of Contingent Contracts, HARV. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 155. That lawyers 
can playa useful role in minimizing these barriers is emphasized in Russell Korobkin & Chris 
Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 
TEX. L. REv. 77 (1997). 
54. See Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the 
Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 LAW & SOC. INQ. 679,700-01 (1996). 
55. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation 
and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 525-26, 564 (1994). 
56. Suchman & Cahill, supra note 54, at 701. 
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by legal journalists) as a new breed of more enlightened transactors, 
as much business advisers as legal advisers. They happily tell of the 
role they have played in the Valley's creation story. They probably 
do deserve a good round of applause, but this story-the belief that 
what they are doing is good, right and special-sounds suspiciously 
like a myth itself. That, in turn, leads us to lawyers' own myths, and 
the possibility that mythic sense-making can sometimes serve as a 
cover for self-serving behavior, or at least to deflect serious 
professional self-examination. 
B. Myths and Ethics 
A robust area for research in social cognition has to do with 
ethics and altruism: why do people so often behave either well or 
poorly? Some of this research is optimistic. There are intriguing 
findings on moral development (that certain forms of learning can 
prompt more responsible behavior), and substantial emphasis is 
placed on the surprisingly powerful role that perceptions of fairness 
play in motivating behavior. Although the area is a highly contested 
one, there is evidence suggesting that trust and cooperation exist to a 
greater degree than can be explained by calculative "game theory" 
models of repeat play.57 
At the same time, however, there are also darker findings. One 
line of research has to do with what might be termed hypocrisy - the 
tendency to act differently from the beliefs one espouses. The 
standard account of hypocrisy is that the behavior is shameful. A 
person deliberately adopts a benign public posture designed to inflate 
others' perceptions of him or her, while at the same time privately 
acting in a selfish fashion. The cognitive account is very different.58 
Most people are motivated to see themselves (not simply have others 
see them) as good, reasonable and responsible. That is generally 
good news, for their behaviors will often conform to this desired self-
57. See, e.g., Max H. Bazerman et aI., Can Negotiators Outperform Game Theory?, in 
DEBATING RATIONALITY: NONRATIONAL ASPECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING 
78, 78 (Jennifer J. Halpern & Robert N. Stem eds., 1998); Colin F. Camerer, Progress in 
Behavioral Game Theory, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 167, 169 (1997). 
58. See generally C. Daniel Batson et aI., In a Very Different Voice: Unmasking Moral 
Hypocrisy, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1335 (1997); George Loewenstein, Behavioral 
Decision Theory and Business Ethics: Skewed Trade-Offs Between Self and Others, in CODES OF 
CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS, supra note 44, at 214, 214. The 
self-serving inference bias is well-documented among lawyers, too. See Theodore Eisenberg, 
Differing Perceptions of Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy Cases, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 979, 979-82 
(1994); George Loewenstein et aI., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 
22 J. LEG. STUD. 135, 140-41 (1993). 
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image. However, when there is enough ambiguity about what is 
right-a variety of possible inferences-the mind will often 
subconsciously construe the situation selfishly, creating a cover that 
allows the person to maintain consistency between the desired self-
image and the taking of what would, to the external observer, be self-
interested behavior. 
That form of biased sense-making has been the focus, for 
instance, of experimental work on the subject of environmental 
responsibility. A commonly-observed form of hypocrisy is the person 
with progressive political attitudes who drives a gas-guzzling car like a 
sport utility vehicle. Researchers have come up with a fairly complex 
set of explanations for such behavior (some of which has to do with 
time-discounting, impulsiveness, loss aversion and a host of other 
biases), but a sizable part of it is creative rationalization. Max 
Bazerman and his colleagues summarize their research along the 
following lines: 
One explanation for the relationship between self-ratings . and 
assessment of the importance of the behaviors is that the self-
serving bias enables subjects to believe that they are doing well 
relative to others on important activities (and that the ones they are 
not doing well on are not important). These biases may cause 
people to believe that their positive contributions to environmental 
issues are more important than the contributions of others. For 
example, a person who puts a lot of effort into recycling but refuses 
to take public transportation may justify this decision by taking the 
position that recycling is the most important aspect of addressing 
the environmental crisis. Again, the attitudelbehavior gap results, 
in this case because there is ambiguity as to which behaviors are the 
most important in reality.59 
One can, of course, extend this kind of reasoning to many other 
settings. To take the example of Silicon Valley lawyers, I suspect that 
they are highly motivated to develop creation stories that stress the 
special nature of the Valley in societal (not just personal) wealth-
creation, the special role that lawyers have played in this 
development, and a causal connection between lawyers' playing a 
more intermediary than client-advocacy role and these socially 
important outcomes. This myth can offer a rationalization for a 
variety of personal wealth-producing behaviors (e.g., diminished 
59. Max H. Bazerman et aI., Environmental Degradation: Exploring the Rift Between 
Environmentally Benign Attitudes and Environmentally Destructive Behaviors, in CODES OF 
CONDUCf: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS, supra note 44, at 256, 264. For a 
discussion of further work, see generally Max H. Bazerman et aI., The Human Mind as a Barrier 
to Wiser Environmental Agreements, 42 AM. BEHA V. SCIENTIST 1277 (1999). 
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advocacy in the interest of maintaining connections with venture 
capitalists, taking compensation from clients in stock options)60 that 
uncommitted observers would find at least worthy of discussion. 
Once again, I am not saying that Silicon Valley lawyers are wrong: 
indeed, I am one of those who sees them in more ways than not as a 
model for good business lawyering. All I am saying is that Silicon 
Valley lawyers (and those who want to be like them) have come to 
believe a Silicon Valley Gilgamesh that, while grounded in empirical 
observation, is probably embellished in self-serving ways. 
The underlying lesson is extraordinarily important to anyone 
who wishes to promote compliance with either law or ethics, and is 
grossly underappreciated by legal scholars. The prevailing view tends 
to say that law and ethics work very easily with highly socialized 
"good" citizens: the task is simply to formulate and communicate the 
appropriate expectations effectively. As to those who are not so well-
socialized, there need to be carrots and ( especially) sticks. 
The cognitive account complicates this in interesting ways.61 To 
be sure, there are people who are habitually virtuous. There are also 
people who are socialized in such a way to make them highly 
obedient to authority; so long as they are not subject to mixed signals 
from those in authority as to what is appropriate, they will conform to 
expectations. That is their way of reducing the anxiety that comes 
from assuming a greater measure of personal responsibility for one's 
actions. But the great bulk of people, especially those who succeed in 
highly competitive environments, will filter legal and ethical 
expectations through individual or group lenses. For many, that 
filtration will involve an implicit and unconscious search for ways to 
maintain consistency between the desire to be good and the desire to 
be successful. This form of rationalization can readily blunt the 
power of "official" norms. 
In an interesting line of empirical research, social psychologist 
Tom Tyler has looked at compliance with a variety of legal rules: tax, 
intellectual property, etc.62 His work argues that traditional 
60. Putting aside the conflict of interest questions, it should be clear that lawyers who have 
an equity interest in their clients have that much more motivation to encourage the optimism 
(not necessarily realism) of their clients. 
61. For a suggestion that lawyers do poorly at understanding this, see Linda Klebe Trevino 
et aI., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works and What Hurts?, 41 CAL. MGMT. 
REV. 131 (1999). 
62. See supra text accompanying note 7. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE 
OBEY THE LAW (1990); Tom Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A 
Psychological Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 219 (1997). 
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influences like probability of detection and severity of sanctions 
dominate only at relatively high numbers-far higher than society 
delivers in areas such as software piracy (making unauthorized 
copies) or, for that matter, most forms of misconduct short of murder. 
Below that, personal choices as to compliance are affected by the 
actor's evaluation of the legitimacy of the regulation. Of great 
importance here is the fairness of the norm, especially in terms of the 
process by which it was formulated and applied. 
If that is right, the task of promoting "good" behavior by lawyers 
will be problematic on a number of grounds. Much of legal ethics is 
aspirational, and even the mandatory is grossly underenforced. There 
is ample room for people to come to believe that the probability of 
sanction from some unvirtuous course of action is small; they 
probably even underestimate what sanctions might occur. In this 
setting, the mind turns to testing the legitimacy of the expectation. 
Consciously or not, it becomes easy for many people to denigrate or 
distinguish the norm, especially when it has some ambiguity to it 
either as formulated or applied to the situation in which the lawyer 
finds himself. The rationalizations-which some psychologists call 
"intuitive lawyering"63-are familiar ones that we have all employed: 
everyone else is doing it, or would do it were they in my situation; I'm 
doing it for the greater good (i.e., when I'm more successful or 
powerful I'll be "better" than others); I have no power over the 
situation; and so on.64 What is important here is the creative tendency 
to develop illusory beliefs in which one has confidence to support the 
rationalization. 
One can see here, for instance, the disturbing power of 
cynicism.65 Cynicism is not so much a mode of thought of the morally 
bankrupt as it is a way that highly socialized individuals and groups 
try to maintain self-respect in the face of the pressure to succeed. For 
instance, a belief that the pronounced norms of legal ethics are the 
product of already wealthy and successful lawyers who themselves 
63. See Roderick M. Kramer & David M. Messick, Ethical Cognition and the Framing of 
Organizational Dilemmas: Decision Makers as Intuitive Lawyers, in CODES OF CONDUCf: 
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS, supra note 44, at 59, 69. 
64. See generally EXCUSES: MASQUERADES IN SEARCH OF GRACE (c. R. Snyder et al. 
eds., 1983). 
65. For the suggestion that people often are overly cynical in their evaluations of others, 
see generally Chip Heath, On the Social Psychology of Agency Relationships: Lay Theories of 
Motivation Overemphasize Extrinsic Incentives, 78 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 25 (1999); Justin Kruger & Thomas Gilovich, "NaiVe Cynicism" in Everyday 
Theories of Responsibility Assessment: On Biased Assumptions of Bias, 76 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 743 (1999). 
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would not behave in accordance with their own dictates, especially if 
they were in "my" situation, can readily undermine the legitimacy of 
the stated norm, and trigger a cascade of implicit excuse-making. I 
suspect that many lawyers overestimate the self-serving behavior of 
other lawyers simply because the resulting impression facilitates 
rationalization in the face of intense competition. It is much like the 
tendency of people to believe that panhandlers usually lie about their 
claimed needs and tend to misuse money on alcohol or drugs. That 
belief is formed without anything more than anecdotal evidence in 
the way of empirical support. That such a belief is often strongly held 
suggests that its function may largely be to make subjects of requests 
feel better about keeping their money for themselves. 
The implication of all this is fairly clear, and helps us understand 
why it is frequently so hard to get people to behave in the way legal 
or ethical rule-makers want. Intended audiences test expressed 
norms for legitimacy, and their evaluation is predictably self-serving. 
Target groups can easily develop mythic beliefs that effectively blunt 
the impact of the rule without much in the way of guilt. I suspect that 
this poses a severe problem in business firms. Rationally, as many 
companies have discovered, there are extraordinary costs associated 
with employee misbehavior in the form of fraudulent sales practices, 
etc. As a result, many firms invest heavily in compliance and ethics 
programs. But by all accounts, such programs are not easy to make 
effective. 
There is an interesting story from Xerox Corporation, which has 
long had a thoughtful and well-funded ethics and compliance 
program, indeed something of a model. High level managers were 
sufficiently pleased with their system so they allowed a journalist an 
unusual level of access to sales and marketing personnel to observe 
true "customer orientation" at work.66 Surprisingly, the reporter 
instead found an internal culture that clung to military and sports 
imagery, with not infrequent abuses of customer trust and substantial 
bragging about the "wins" in ritualistic group celebrations that 
followed a successful sales period.67 The disconnect with the 
expressed norm, if true,68 is striking. What was most interesting in the 
66. See John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize Individuals into Evildoing, in CODES 
OF CONDUCf: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS, supra note 44, at 13, 25. 
67. The resulting book is DAVID DORSEY, THE FORCE (1994). 
68. Obviously, journalists have their own self-serving fonns of inference, perhaps 
"discovering" a state of affairs that is useful largely because it tells a marketable story. I will 
take an agnostic position about how much of the disconnect is real in the Xerox account. 
However, it at least rings true with my experience in other fields with high sales and marketing 
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account is the nature of the rationalization - the language and culture 
carefully framed the salesman-customer interaction as a game or 
battle voluntarily entered into by both sides, so that even an 
"aggressive" win was legitimately earned. That was a guilt-reducing 
frame. But why was the company's announced (and presumably 
smart) policy of customer respect unable to reframe the norm? 
The explanation is no doubt a complicated one, but two myth 
perceptions are likely, both driven by the promotion and 
compensation strategy common to Xerox and most other highly 
competitive firms of establishing strong rewards for meeting or 
exceeding gradually ascending sales quotas, and dealing harshly with 
those who fall short. One is cynicism, the belief-inaccurate, I 
suspect-that the company policy was just another form of 
advertising and spin, not meant to be taken seriously below. 
Another, consistent with Tyler's view, is that such a policy was 
perceived as unfair and hence illegitimate by those who risk such 
serious personal loss under the prevailing compensation and 
promotion structure if they comply when others in the company do 
not. To those with reason to fear falling short absent aggressive steps, 
it becomes psychologically comforting to imagine that "everyone does 
it." Once again, the important insight here is that such beliefs are 
formed not because they are accurate (they mayor may not be), but 
because, on an individual or small group level, they are useful forms 
of rationalization to support the pursuit of success. There is an 
important message here for lawyers: Constructing an effective 
ethics/compliance program involves not only articulating goals and 
procedures, but also fighting the kinds of self-serving perceptions that 
threaten to undermine their legitimacy. That is more easily said than 
done, and is a task for which lawyers often are intellectually ill-
equipped. 
III. POSTSCRIPT: MYTHS AND STORIES 
If accuracy is nice but not necessary in sense-making, then what is 
necessary? The answer is, something that preserves plausibility and 
coherence, something that is reasonable and memorable, something 
that embodies past experience and expectations, something that 
resonates with other people, something that can be constructed 
retrospectively but also can be used prospectively, something that 
captures both feeling and thought, something that allows for 
embellishment to fit current oddities, something that is fun to 
components (e.g., stockbrokers). 
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construct. In short, what is necessary in sense-making is a good 
story.69 
Much of the foregoing has been cautionary rather than 
encouraging. Perhaps, then, we should end more hopefully by asking 
if there is something in the research on the psychology of sense-
making that would constructively help teach us how to overcome the 
more dysfunctional forms of myth and rationalization that put such a 
hard protective coating over the pursuit of self-interest. For instance, 
we have learned that anyone who wishes to make legal or ethical 
norms effective must first persuade her often skeptical audience of 
their legitimacy, difficult sometimes as that might be. That involves 
more than articulating the norm, as if the reasons for following it are 
self-evident, something I suspect is lost on many rule-makers who fall 
prey to the false consensus effect and overestimate the extent to 
which others share one's own beliefs, thereby underestimating the 
challenge of interpersonal communication. The need to justify in 
anticipation of often self-serving popular skepticism is something that 
commentators on the "expressive" function of law have yet to explore 
in any depth.70 
This is too large a task, and I know too little, to try to offer a 
thorough prescription. But one theme in the literature that is 
potentially helpful is the emphasis on the role of stories in effective 
sense-making and communication. I have no desire to revisit the 
controversy of recent years on story-telling in (or "as") legal 
scholarship. There is ample support from the social sciences, 
however, for the underlying idea that stories have a greater capacity 
to influence than more rational forms of discourse. That the most 
important cultural myths tend to be in the form of stories is long-
recognized evidence of this. 
No doubt much of it has to do with the affective response that 
good stories generate.71 Such stories are told in such a way that they 
69. KARL E. WEICK, SENSEMAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS 60-61 (1995). 
70. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
2021 (1996); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 
964 (1996). I do not want to be critical here. I agree completely with the idea that law can be 
important in social norm creation, but suspect that it is easy to underestimate the difficulty in 
communicating legal norms in a way that has substantial persuasive power. For a suggestion 
that the law of insider trading may actually serve as an example of savvy norm entrepreneurship 
because of the way the underlying story is presented to the public, see Donald C. Langevoort, 
Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1319, 1328-30 (1999). 
71. See GARY KLEIN, SOURCES OF POWER: How PEOPLE MAKE DECISIONS 177-96 
(1998). Klein's book emphasizes what much other recent research in judgment does: that there 
is an emotional "feeling" component to decision-making that has been underestimated in much 
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are easily remembered and shared with others. In emphasizing the 
role of stories in organizational cognition, Karl Weick tells of a 
nuclear power facility, Diablo Canyon in California, that like all 
others has a compelling organizational need to stress safety 
precautions, especially taking fairly small risks seriously.72 That sort 
of thing could, and was, communicated dispassionately through 
lectures, training sessions and compliance manuals. One day a 
construction worker drove a Ford Mustang too fast near the facility, 
hitting a parked pick-up. The pick-up caught fire, starting a forest fire 
that for a time threatened to move dangerously close to the facility. 
Ultimately, no further harm was done. But the story lived on 
(probably embellished) in the facility's internal workplace culture, a 
readily communicated symbol of how big problems can come from 
small events. One suspects that the Mustang story is still worth more 
than a host of lectures.73 
But how many lawyers would build a story like this into a 
compliance program? By nature, of course, business lawyers in their 
professional roles are lecturers and critics, not storytellers. There is a 
great faith in the ability to persuade-to create a sense of legitimacy 
for what others are expected to do-simply through formal 
declaration and argumentation, and I suspect that this compromises 
lawyers' effectiveness in generating desired behavior by others. I 
would guess that a good corporate lawyer, wanting to induce 
managers' compliance with norms of fiduciary responsibility, does 
much more by telling a story from some recent cases of the court's 
displeasure with another high level executive's bow to a comparable 
temptation than any systematic analysis of elements of the cause of 
action in evaluating breaches of fiduciary duty. Indeed, Ed Rock's 
recent survey of Delaware corporate law cases on shift-in-control 
other work. He gives a vivid description of expertise in terms of "gut feelings," (i.e., visceral 
ways of sensing when something is amiss by telling the story of a firefighter who left a burning 
building just before the collapse of a floor simply on gut reaction, only later being able to 
articulate in more scientific terms why there was danger). See id. at 21-23. 
72. See WEICK, supra note 69, at 130. 
73. At Florida Power & Light, company managers once came upon a process that, in their 
view, created a higher level of productivity. They were sufficiently proud that they nominated 
themselves for the Demming Award, recognizes model forms of creative efficiency in American 
business. One of the inspectors, a Japanese businessman, came to review the application and, 
with a few deft questions, ripped apart the innovation. The good results, he concluded, were 
dumb luck. His pronunciation of this finding, however, was "You were rucky." To this day, we 
are told, the term "rucky" has become the code within the company culture for encouraging 
greater analytical care (and avoiding self-serving inference) in evaluating data. See Chip Heath 
et ai., Cognitive Repairs: How Organizational Practices Can Compensate for Individual 
Shortcomings, 20 RES. ORG. BEHAV.l, 6-7 (1998). 
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transactions is written to be a morality story, ideally suited for 
retelling to others.74 I suspect, in fact, that the court's recitation of the 
facts involves an editing designed to sharpen the sense of drama and 
diminish ambiguity. 
Without wanting to make any overly ambitious claim, there is an 
appealing connection between law and myth in suggesting that 
lawyers wishing to promote legal and ethical compliance by clients 
and other audiences (e.g., other attorneys) learn to find and use 
stories better than they currently do. In my work dealing with 
lawyers who assist in a client's fraud, a review of the prevailing rules, 
even a glimpse at social science research on complicity in wrongdoing, 
has at best a moderate impact on most audiences. Most 
inexperienced audience members cannot readily imagine actually 
encountering such a problem, and probably overestimate their ability 
to control the situation were they to encounter it. Better results come 
from having them think about Clark Clifford, the late, distinguished 
Washington lawyer who toward the end of his career became 
complicit, to some degree, in the BCCI banking scandaU5 If they are 
not already familiar with Clifford, the audience can quickly see him as 
the embodiment of what most young lawyers want to be: powerful, 
admired and wealthy. They can connect with him, if by nothing but 
wishful thinking. From there, it is easy to set out the facts and pose 
the question of how, or why, the complicity followed. While a few 
might come away with the cynical conclusion that Clifford was 
basically venal and had masterfully fostered a contrary illusion over 
the course of his career, most will not. They will have to struggle with 
the issue, and in the process, I suspect, see the problem in some 
depth, emotionally as well as intellectually. Then we can get to the 
rules. 
Once more, I will concede that there is nothing all that new here: 
the power of well-told stories is another trite insight of modern 
thought, well-incorporated in the law and literature genre of legal 
thinking. What is significant and interesting, to me at least, is simply 
how well it fits into our more general cognitive account of human 
sense-making. By and large, the narrative structure is well-suited to 
conveying the impression of the world as a more controlled, 
74. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 
44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1047 (1997); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social 
Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1253, 1270 (1999). 
75. See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?: A Behavioral Inquiry into 
Lawyers' Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 V AND. L. REV. 75, 77-78 (1993). 
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predictable place. But often the stories people tell to themselves and 
others are wrong, and for all their adaptiveness on average, myths can 
sometimes be too comforting or distracting. The point to end on is 
this: precisely because their myths are often so adaptive as anxiety 
buffers, people will not let go of them easily. Those who have to fight 
through other peoples' myths, as good lawyers are occasionally called 
upon to do, will often have to have a more compelling story than the 
one they want to displace. 
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